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Reliance on market forces can lead to underinvestment in social welfare enhancing innovation.
The lack of new medical products in the area of neglected diseases is a case in point. R&D for
neglected diseases has increased with new funding and collaborations taking place mainly through
product development partnerships (PDPs). PDPs are self-governing, private non-profit R&D organ-
izations. In contrast to push and pull instruments designed to address private-sector R&D under-
investment, PDPs have emerged voluntarily to address this public health challenge. In this study
we examine how non-profit R&D collaboration for neglected diseases takes place through PDPs.
We find that PDPs act as ‘system integrators’ that leverage the resources and capabilities of a
network of public, philanthropic and private-sector partners. This paper contributes to an under-
standing of R&D in a non-profit context and highlights the importance of collaboration and non-
market institutions for promoting innovation where market failures occur.
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1. Introduction
Over a billion people are affected by diseases that have a
large burden in developing countries, but no or small
burden in the developed world (World Health
Organization 2010). Historically, government public
health programmes and the pharmaceutical industry have
neglected these poverty-related diseases. Very few new
medical products (drugs, vaccines and other biological
products, diagnostics and vector control products) are de-
veloped for their prevention and treatment.
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms, without market incentives to spur
their commercial interests, are reluctant to engage inde-
pendently in these endeavours. As a result, they pass up
opportunities for socially valuable innovation.
Economists have proposed a range of economic instru-
ments to incentivize ﬁrm-level R&D in neglected diseases.
Push mechanisms that aim to bring down ﬁrms’ costs of
R&D, such as grants, tax credits and loans are more
broadly used by policy-makers. Pull mechanisms, on the
other hand, such as milestone or end prizes, aim to
increase market attractiveness by lowering the risk of
R&D and assuring revenue for the outputs.
Meanwhile, a rising number of self-governing private
non-proﬁt organizations have emerged to catalyse R&D
for neglected diseases. Product development partnerships
(PDPs) have produced various new diagnostics and
therapies in the form of reformulated or repurposed
versions of existing drugs, vaccines and biological
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products. They have also built signiﬁcant R&D project
portfolios with several novel vaccines and drug candidates
in the pipeline, including new chemical entities (NCE).
Most PDPs do not undertake any in-house R&D activities:
instead they operate through external collaboration. PDPs
mobilize funding from philanthropic and public entities
and form partnerships with a number of public and
private institutions (including academia and public
research institutes, pharmaceutical, biotechnology and
other private for-proﬁt ﬁrms, such as contract research
organizations) to implement R&D projects.
This openness of PDPs to external R&D collaboration
can appear to mirror a similar trend in the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industry (Juliano 2013). However, the
motivation for PDPs to pursue R&D collaboration is
clearly associated with their non-proﬁt mission. Large
pharmaceutical ﬁrms are increasingly sourcing their
R&D portfolios by in-licensing external R&D projects
and through mergers and acquisitions to raise growth
and revenue prospects (Schuhmacher et al. 2013). In
contrast, the common goal of PDPs is to build R&D port-
folios to develop products that address unmet health
needs. This means that the ﬁnal product must be afford-
able and accessible to patients. In this context, partners
involved in PDP-led R&D projects have to operate
within the conﬁnes of the PDP mission. The concept of
‘partnership’ implies a commitment to a common goal
through the joint provision of complementary resources
and expertise, and the joint sharing of the risks involved
(Ridley 2001).
This research is informed by a literature review and in-
depth interviews with the staff of PDPs. Previous literature
has described the role of PDPs in the neglected disease
landscape (Moran 2005b; Grace 2006, 2010; Chataway
et al. 2007, 2010; Moran et al. 2010). While building on
this literature, we further explain the operation of PDPs,
identify their core capabilities, provide an update of PDP
outputs, and analyse the variety among PDPs and the con-
straints of the PDP approach.
This study is divided into seven sections. Following the
introduction, Section 2 presents the problem of insufﬁcient
innovation for neglected diseases. Section 3 then describes
the economic instruments that are designed to stimulate
innovation in neglected diseases. Section 4 explores how
PDPs access and leverage external resources and
capabilities through R&D collaborations. Section 5
explains the variety within the PDP landscape. Section 6
discusses the limitations of the PDP organizational form.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. The shortfall of innovation for
neglected diseases
The expression ‘neglected disease’ indicates the problem of
insufﬁcient new medical products developed to address
diseases that create a large burden in developing countries,
but have little or no impact in the developed world. There
is no single deﬁnition of a ‘neglected disease’. The WHO
deﬁnes ‘neglected diseases’ as a group of 17 diseases affect-
ing more than 1 billion people worldwide that persist
under conditions of poverty and are concentrated almost
exclusively in impoverished populations in developing
countries (World Health Organization 2010).1 In particu-
lar, infectious diseases account for 10 million deaths each
year, of which more than 90% occur in developing
countries (World Health Organization 2010). For the
purposes of our study, we consider the WHO-listed
diseases and also include three communicable diseases:
TB, malaria and HIV/AIDS.2 These diseases are prevalent
in developing countries and often co-exist with other neg-
lected diseases. However, they differ from other ‘neglected’
diseases in that they may also be found in developed
countries (e.g. TB and HIV/AIDS) and generally receive
more ﬁnancing for R&D and delivery.
New medical products are essential for the prevention,
control and elimination of disease. The current level of
R&D for new medical products targeting neglected
diseases is negligible relative to the health burden of
these diseases. The imbalance is evident if we consider:
ﬁrst, the amount of R&D investment for neglected
diseases compared to the global R&D investment for all
diseases and the health burden of neglected diseases; and
secondly, the number of new medical products developed
for neglected diseases compared to other diseases.
One study has found that global R&D investments by
the public, philanthropic and private sectors in neglected
disease research in 2010 (approximately US$2.4 billion)
accounted for only 1% of overall health R&D investments
(US$240 billion) (Røttingen et al. 2013). Funding for neg-
lected diseases has slightly increased from an estimated
US$2.8 billion in 2005 (Global Forum for Health
Research 2008) to US$3.045 billion in 2011 (Policy Cures
2012). The largest funders are public donors, with a total
of US$1.9 billion in 2011, followed by philanthropic
donors, with a total of US$525.1 million in 2011 (Policy
Cures 2012).
The small number of new medical products for neglected
diseases, as compared to other diseases, is an indication of
the persistent gap in innovation within this area. One
landmark study found that in the period 1975–99, 1,393
new drugs (excluding vaccines) were made available to the
public. However, only 16 of these were intended for neg-
lected diseases (Troullier et al. 2002). A recent study ﬁnds
that of the 850 new therapeutic products (NCE, new indi-
cations, new formulations, ﬁxed-dose combinations, and
vaccines and biologicals) registered in the period 2000–
11, only 37 (4%) were indicated for neglected diseases,
comprising 25 products with a new indication or formula-
tion, and eight vaccines or biological products. Of those 25
products, only four were NCE. Only 1% of all registered
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clinical trials were for neglected diseases (Pedrique et al.
2013).
Generally ﬁrms invest in R&D with the expectation that
the revenues generated from the sales of new medical
products will increase as a result. They ﬁnance R&D
from their own resources (proﬁts), as well as from public
support instruments, such as tax breaks and grants.
Nonetheless, ﬁrms generally tend to invest less than the
socially optimal levels of R&D. The reasons include:
high risks and costs, problems of R&D ﬁnancing and in-
complete appropriability of returns to R&D (Nelson 1959;
Hall and Lener 2010). To address the appropriability
problem, ﬁrms can seek legal protection for their inven-
tions through government-granted patents that give the
ﬁrms time-limited monopoly control (i.e. manufacture,
use and sales) over the product. Patents support a ﬁrm’s
pricing strategy, aimed at setting a price as proﬁtable as the
buyer (there can be several possible buyers, such as gov-
ernment health authorities, insurers, prescribers/pharma-
cists or patients out-of-pocket) is willing to pay. Use of
patent-protected inventions normally requires authoriza-
tion by the patent holder. Only after the patent protection
expires, generally a 20-year period, can any other ﬁrm
produce and market a generic version of the product.
This competition helps to bring down the product price.
The pharmaceutical industry has historically invested
very little in R&D for new medical products within the
area of neglected diseases. This is to be expected, as the
market for neglected diseases does not offer ﬁrms many
opportunities for proﬁt, despite the gross unmet needs for
treatment. Accordingly, the economic barriers to R&D in
neglected diseases by private ﬁrms can be described as
follows (Webber and Kremer 2001):
. Commercial markets are small.
. Individual purchasing power is limited, even though
the number of patients may be very large.
. High R&D costs (estimated to be the same as for new
medical products for other diseases) and the inherent
risk in R&D will not be covered by returns on
investments.
Moreover, patents as an incentive for the appropriability
of R&D returns are not an effective mechanism to stimu-
late R&D in neglected diseases, given the absence of a
proﬁtable market, and may rather affect the availability
of affordable medical products (World Health
Organization 2006).
It can be assumed that the risks and costs of new
product development for neglected disease R&D may be
the same as for other diseases.3 Medical product develop-
ment is generally very costly, with a high risk of failure.
However, precise data on the R&D costs of pharmaceut-
ical ﬁrms are generally unavailable or undisclosed. This is
a critical constraint for the adequate design of economic
instruments and their employment to incentivize R&D in
neglected as well as in other diseases. When ﬁrms do
provide cost data, it is not speciﬁed how the R&D costs
are calculated, or what is included in the cost (Morgan
et al. 2011). It is estimated that a drug in the form of
NCE may take 13–5 years, from discovery to when it is
available on the market. For vaccines, the full R&D
process may take 12 years. The levels of attrition (likeli-
hood of project failure) can be close to 60%, higher in the
discovery stage. Published estimates of the R&D costs
diverge widely, with existing studies varying in
methodologies, data sources, samples and time periods.
For example, a recent study by health economists
calculated that the net median R&D cost may be in the
range of US$13–204 million, while existing estimates range
from US$161 million to US$1.8 billion (Light and
Warburton 2011).
There are also no concrete data on the overall extent of
R&D investment in medical products by pharmaceutical
ﬁrms. While R&D costs have risen in the past two decades,
revenues for pharmaceutical ﬁrms have increased six times
faster, with net proﬁts after taxes substantially higher than
proﬁts for all other Fortune 500 companies (Light and
Lexchin 2012). At the same time, the overall rate of innov-
ation in the pharmaceutical industry has been in decline.
The number of total innovative new medical products
approved has fallen since the 1990s, while many of those
are ‘me too’ drugs, rather than new chemical (or molecu-
lar) entities, and are without signiﬁcant therapeutic value.
3. Economic instruments to stimulate
innovation in neglected diseases
In the last decades, various instruments have been
designed, and some have been implemented to address
the underinvestment problem illustrated above. With the
aim of ﬁlling the gap between private and social returns to
R&D in the ﬁeld of neglected diseases, ‘push’ and ‘pull’
instruments have been explored by public and philan-
thropic sectors for ﬁnancing and increasing R&D efforts.
‘Push’ instruments aim to stimulate R&D by reducing
the costs of R&D for the industry. These include instru-
ments that pay for inputs to R&D, such as providing direct
funding to research, particularly basic research (Toole
2002), but may also extend to applied research (grants to
universities, government public research laboratories, or
for joint projects with industry), R&D tax breaks, direct
grants for small ﬁrms, funding for clinical trials in develop-
ing countries, open innovation platforms, patent pools and
related initiatives, fast track regulatory review (approvals),
pre-competitive research platforms for sharing R&D costs
and regulatory harmonization. Some of the problems
associated with pull instruments are that they may not
provide sufﬁcient incentive for R&D by themselves.
Incentives between grantees and funders may be imper-
fectly aligned, and the instruments are vulnerable to
politization/lobbying (Hegde and Sampat 2014).
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‘Pull’ instruments pay for the outputs of R&D. The
main barrier considered is insufﬁcient market attractive-
ness, rather than the high cost of R&D. Pull instruments
aim to address the problem of a lack of commercial
markets. They are designed to create demand for yet-to-
be-developed products and effectively enlarge the market
for medical products in neglected diseases. Pull instru-
ments reward the output (new medical products de-
veloped) rather than pay for inputs to R&D. There is
limited practical experience with pull instruments for neg-
lected diseases.4 One attractive feature of pull instruments
is that they are less costly than other instruments, as they
do not entail upfront payments. Money is spent only if
milestones are reached or if new medical products are de-
veloped in accordance with pre-deﬁned criteria. The
speciﬁed criteria would be pre-set by the purchaser (i.e.
government, philanthropic organization or international
organization). The ﬁrm or other entity could then decide
on the R&D strategy to deploy in order to meet the
criteria. Once the milestone is reached or the product is
developed, the disbursement of the money committed
would be made, and the purchaser could make the
product available to patients at low or no cost. Examples
of pull instruments include: prizes, funds for end-payments
(such as the Health Impact Fund), funds that would
allocate resources to any research organization,5 and
advance market commitments (AMC).
A critical condition of the pull instrument is that the
payment has to be sufﬁciently attractive to provide incen-
tives to the participants in the scheme. In theory, an
adequate size of the incentive may vary among partici-
pants. For private ﬁrms, it requires increasing the likeli-
hood of returns to their R&D investments (at best, brings
proﬁts, at minimum, no loss). For other types of organiza-
tions, such as non-proﬁt PDPs, the size of the incentive
required may be smaller. In the design of pull instruments,
a crucial element is the amount of the commitments
(including speciﬁcations, such as the doses to be purchased
and purchase price) that would be required to provide a
sufﬁciently strong incentive to create a market that would
surpass the barrier to R&D investment. Kremer (2001)
foresaw that substantial industrial investment in neglected
disease R&D would occur only if expected rates of return
were broadly equivalent to those anticipated from R&D in
conventional areas. However, without proper information
on the actual costs of R&D, public resources may be
wasted. Robust data on the costs of R&D for new
medical product development should inform these deci-
sions. However, as discussed earlier, existing estimates
for medical product innovation are unreliable.
A different means to spur medical innovation is via open
models, based on collaboration. In the discovery phase,
open models of innovation rely on collaboration, sharing
of information among volunteers and open access to data.
Two examples of these projects that have been studied are
CSIR Team India Consortium’s Open Source Drug
Discovery project and the Synaptic Leap’s
Schistosomiasis project (A˚rdal and Rottingen 2012).
Various pull and push mechanisms and alternative
means for medical product innovation have been recently
reviewed by an expert working group of the WHO (World
Health Organization 2012b).
4. Organizations to drive innovation in
neglected diseases: PDPs
Evidence suggests that collaboration in R&D for neglected
diseases is increasing. One study has found that there are
approximately 348 organizations from the private and
public sectors (academic/research institutions, biotechnol-
ogy companies and other medium and small ﬁrms, such as
contract research organizations, and large pharmaceutical
companies) participating alone or in partnership with each
other in the development of a combined pipeline of 374
drugs and vaccines for 23 neglected diseases (BioVentures
for Global Health 2012). The majority of collaborations
are reported to be taking place through PDPs, with a 40%
share of participation in the total number of projects (Bio
Ventures for Global Health 2012). Another study has
found that for the 123 new medical products in develop-
ment in the period 2000–11, public organizations were
involved in 66 products (54%), private industry in 28
products (23%), and private non-proﬁt organizations
(including PDPs, charities, foundations and philanthropic
institutions) in 19 products (15%), with the remaining ten
products (8%) involving a mix of sponsors. All three NCE
for neglected diseases were being sponsored by private
non-proﬁt organizations (Pedrique et al. 2013). It also
appears that large pharmaceutical ﬁrms are increasingly
interested in joining PDP projects more than in
undertaking their own. The annual report by the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) for 2012
(IFPMA 2012), lists 132 R&D projects for new medicines
and vaccines (excluding HIV/AIDS) involving IFPMA
member companies, of which 112 are projects with
PDPs, and only 20 (15%) projects are ﬁrm-only
undertakings.
PDPs in the past 15 years have become part of the
puzzle of how to close the innovation gap for neglected
diseases. One study found that the PDP pipeline included
63 neglected disease drug projects (excluding vaccines,
diagnostics and microbicides) under way at the end of
2004, including two new drugs at the registration stage
and 18 new products in clinical trials, half of which had
already reached phase III (Moran 2005a). However, new
projects have been launched since the end of 2004, amp-
lifying this trend (Bio Ventures for Global Health 2012). A
full list and description of new products developed by
PDPs is found in Appendix 2 at the end of this paper.
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Since the 1990s the number of PDPs has grown from
one to 23 PDPs in 2014, which we have identiﬁed in our
study.6 For purposes of our study, we deﬁne PDPs as self-
governing,7 private, non-proﬁt organizations that aim to
develop new medical products in the area of neglected
diseases. PDPs are not push or pull instruments for
R&D. As discussed in Section 3, push and pull instruments
are policy instruments designed mainly to promote private
investment in R&D.8 In contrast, PDPs are R&D organ-
izations that have emerged to bring about innovations in
an area where neither the private or public non-market
institutions can, or are willing to, do the task alone
(Chataway et al. 2010).
4.1 History of PDPs
Members of the global public health community (such as
the World Health Organization, civil society organizations
and doctors) initiated PDPs as a practical means to
increase R&D for neglected diseases. However, it is not
evident why a new organizational innovation in the form
of PDPs was needed in the context of existing organiza-
tions in global public health governance. These include
public research institutions, ﬁrms (biotechnology and big
pharmaceutical ﬁrms), government agencies, international
organizations such as the WHO, the World Bank, UNDP,
UNESCO, UNICEF and UNITAID, civil society organ-
izations and existing networks of research collaborations.
We trace the origins of PDPs and identify the gaps in
existing organizational structures to which PDPs are
responding.
Some of the early PDPs were catalysed at the WHO
through the Special Programme for Research and
Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) and the experience
with partnerships it progressively forged in the 1980s–
1990s.9 Before the TDR, there was no international frame-
work focused on coordinating research to support infec-
tious disease control, particularly in the developing world
(UNICEF et al. 2007). The role of TDR evolved in time,
from a focus on strengthening research capability building
in endemic countries to promoting international collabor-
ation to increase R&D for neglected diseases. Scientists
engaged in the private sector had been participating in
TDR committees, but the private sector was not formally
engaged in the work of the TDR. In time, opportunities
arose for product development in collaboration with the
industry. However, it appeared to be too costly and
complex for TDR to manage and implement, and it was
outside of its mandate. With this in mind, the idea of
creating independent, disease-focused organizations
appeared as an avenue to speed up R&D and the
delivery of new medical products to meet health needs.
TDR has assisted in the creation various PDPs since
1999,10 while other PDPs were created independently.11
Non-proﬁt philanthropic foundations, such as the
Rockefeller Foundation, have played an active role in
cultivating PDPs. International humanitarian
organizations also have played a key role (Me´decins Sans
Frontie`res 2001). The establishment of the Gates
Foundation by Bill and Melinda Gates in 2000 gave a
big push to PDPs as a new source of available funding.
PDPs have also surged in the context of the process of
‘vertical dis-integration’ in the pharmaceutical industry
(Cockburn 2005).
4.2 PDPs in medical product innovation ecosystems
PDPs can be understood as functioning in the context of
health innovation ecosystems (Papaioannou et al. 2009)
that reach beyond national boundaries. The structure of
PDPs is shaped, and in turn, can shape the ecosystem in
which they operate. Our context for analysis is therefore
the broader ecosystem (rather than the industry), which
includes the community of organizations (i.e. suppliers
and sources of knowledge), institutions (i.e. regulatory
authorities and government bodies), and individuals (i.e.
managers, policy-makers in disease-endemic countries and
patients) that inﬂuence PDPs. The ecosystem is composed
of multiple players involved in the production and dissem-
ination of drugs, vaccines and diagnostics for neglected
diseases, and is inﬂuenced by external factors relating to
public policy, ﬁnancing, regulation, intellectual property,
human resources and infrastructure, and markets.
The function of the ecosystem can be guided by prin-
ciples for medical product innovation that responds to
health needs. An expert commission under the auspices
of the World Health Assembly advanced the following
principles (World Health Organization 2006):
. availability: new product development and adequate
supply (quantity) of product
. acceptability: usability and appropriateness of the
product tailored to speciﬁc needs
. quality: product effectiveness, standards for carrying
out testing and clinical trials
. affordability: ensuring the ﬁnancing of product devel-
opment and procurement, affordable prices
Fig. 1 shows the innovation ecosystem under which PDPs
operate and the principles that we consider should guide
the development of medical products.
4.3 PDPs as system integrators
The characteristics of PDP organizational design that dif-
ferentiate them from collaborative bilateral or multilateral
networks on R&D for neglected diseases, public institu-
tions and pharmaceutical ﬁrms with R&D capacity
include the following:
. They are established as non-proﬁt entities that guaran-
tee them independence and no shareholder expectations
of growth and revenue maximization motives.
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. Their objective is to develop new medical products that
can have a public health impact (specialized, access
core to their mission).
. Their focus is on developing ‘system integration’
capabilities to engage and leverage diverse resources
and capabilities of various actors in the R&D chain.
. They have in-house capabilities to manage a portfolio
of R&D projects.
. External partners often undertake the R&D activities,
though some have in-house R&D capacity.
PDPs are able to operate on a not-for-proﬁt model,
provided that they can receive sufﬁcient funding for their
R&D projects and operations. Thus, a fundamental
element of the PDP is to attract funds from donors.
Public and philanthropic donors measure returns to invest-
ment differently than is the case of shareholders in the
pharmaceutical industry R&D model. As such, philan-
thropic and public donors do not exert the same pressure
as shareholders and venture capitalists do on for-proﬁt
ﬁrms in terms of maximizing proﬁt. Donors are interested
in the end result of PDPs in terms of medical products
developed to address unmet health needs.
Funding is also a central enabling factor for R&D col-
laboration that takes place through PDPs. It allows PDPs
to make propositions attractive to partners and reduces
their risk (cost) of engagement. PDP ﬁnancing is
channelled to pay for services (i.e. academia and contract
research organizations in clinical trials), and reduces the
costs of product development for the industry involved in
R&D, with clinical trials, manufacturing and registration
being the largest cost factors. As described by Chataway
et al. (2007), PDPs can play the roles of both integrator
and broker among various private and public sector
actors. In the innovation ecosystem, PDPs play the role
of ‘system integrator’, which can involve actors at any
stage of the R&D chain, from discovery all the way to
implementation and delivery.
For most PDPs, the capabilities/assets for R&D (e.g.
ﬁnancial resources, vaccine/drug discovery, development,
manufacturing and distribution) do not reside with the
PDP itself. Accordingly, the main avenue by which PDPs
create an R&D resource base is via collaboration. PDPs
search, select and draw in these capabilities/assets from
external sources, including academia, pharmaceutical
ﬁrms, biotechnology ﬁrms, contract research organiza-
tions, public and philanthropic organizations.
As example of product development through PDPs,
Fig. 2 reports the case of the development of a new anti-
malaria drug. The project was led by Drugs for Neglected
Diseases Initiative (DNDi) with the collaboration of TDR.
Traditionally, large pharmaceutical companies are
rarely inclined to share knowledge outside the ﬁrm,
although outsourcing research activities, mergers and ac-
quisitions and in-licensing compounds from biotechnology
ﬁrms are increasing trends (Schuhmacher et al. 2013). It
appears paradoxical that pharmaceutical ﬁrms are willing
to engage in PDP-led R&D projects when they are usually
locked into searching for the next blockbuster product
(Cockburn 2006). According to economic theory, partner-
ships between large pharmaceutical ﬁrms and PDPs in the
form of R&D resource sharing for neglected diseases by
Figure 1. PDPs in medical product innovation ecosystem. Sources: Morel 2005, WHO 2006 (our elaboration).
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for-proﬁt companies, constrained by shareholders’ values,
should not take place. However, through PDPs, such part-
nerships do, in fact, result. The private sector lacks interest
in solely undertaking the range of R&D activities for
medical product development on neglected diseases. Yet,
within the PDP framework, it appears that the private
sector can be induced to collaborate if the costs and risks
are reduced and there are other drivers, such as a boost to
public relations. By working with PDPs, pharmaceutical
ﬁrms can still protect shareholder value while sharing
access to research tools and technology, and undertaking
manufacturing and distributing ﬁnal products with
reduced risks and most costs covered.
For projects in the discovery phase, PDPs tap into the
skills in academia, biotechnology and large pharmaceutical
ﬁrms as knowledge sources, negotiating access for
compound libraries,12 know-how and compound screening
capabilities. PDPs often engage pharmaceutical ﬁrms for
manufacturing, where the latter provide in-kind contribu-
tions, such as infrastructure and personnel time, which aid
in low-cost production.
In general, academia and other public research institu-
tions do not have the full range of necessary resources,
capabilities or assets to undertake medical product R&D,
even though there is a resolve to address unmet health
needs. Public sector institutions involved in R&D are
usually focused on discovery and creating knowledge
(upstream) and translational research, while the industry
is more focused on product development (downstream)
and submissions for regulatory approvals, manufacturing
and scaling, distribution and sales. For a PDP, the
measure of success is not only product development. As
noted in Section 4.2, the aim is to develop new medical
products that are effective, high quality, acceptable to the
target group, and available at an affordable price.
Accordingly, a number of PDPs have agreed to a
common deﬁnition of ‘access’ as referring to a coordinated
set of activities needed to ensure that the products de-
veloped will ultimately have an equitable public health
impact (Brooks et al. 2010). Moreover, many PDPs estab-
lish ‘access’ policies. A PDP access policy may include
deﬁning upfront the contours of a technology that is ap-
propriate and has affordable resource-limited settings.
Generally the target product proﬁle for each R&D
project is developed taking into account the unmet need,
the disease proﬁle, and the local environment (including
the regulatory framework and purchasing power) in
which the product would be delivered. They may also
deﬁne a product design and set benchmarks for product
manufacturing cost and the ﬁnal price. The PDP product
proﬁling helps clarify expectations for all the partners and
subcontractors in R&D projects.
Figure 2. Example of how PDPs work: development of a ﬁxed-dose combination of existing anti-malaria drugs (artesunate (AS) and
meﬂoquine (MQ)), for Latin America and Southeast Asia.
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Most PDPs pick up opportunities for projects based on
dormant or discontinued research elsewhere that can be
applied to neglected diseases. PDPs producing drugs
have generally focused on developing repurposed
products rather than NCE (Pedrique et al. 2013). This is
also the case in the area of vaccines. For instance, the most
clinically advanced malaria vaccine candidate to date
(RTS,S) is being developed by the pharmaceutical ﬁrm
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), the PDP MVI and PATH.13
RTS,S is not a new vaccine candidate. Scientists at GSK,
in collaboration with a US Department of Defense bio-
medical research laboratory, created the vaccine in 1987.
The pricing arrangement announced for the RTS,S vaccine
for young infants and children in sub-Saharan Africa is
that GSK will be paid to cover the costs of the manufac-
ture of the vaccine and will receive a 5% return (Maleria
Vaccines Initiative 2013).
In general, PDPs also aim to keep down the costs of
R&D. While PDPs have to cover the costs of the
product development and take into account the costs of
product delivery (including registration costs), PDPs are
aware that they need to stay as close as possible to the
marginal costs of production to meet their access goals.
PDPs are able to channel most of their resources to pure
R&D activities (in addition to R&D portfolio management
and advocacy for funding), as compared to marketing (to
promote sales), which may command a larger budget for
research in large pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
In negotiating the terms of engagement with partners at
the development stage, PDPs need to carefully evaluate the
access considerations in negotiating the price of
manufacturing and distribution by a partner, as well as
the acceptability of a partner manufacturing and
distributing drugs in disease-endemic countries with long-
term sustainability, on a ‘at cost’ or ‘no proﬁt, no loss’
basis. PDPs need project managers with good market
knowledge and negotiation skills. PDPs can leverage the
fact that commercial incentives do exist for certain neg-
lected diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB,
which are prevalent in both developed and developing
countries. PDPs can also identify target products that
may have potential commercial markets in the private
sector in disease-endemic countries, where manufacturers
can make a margin on sales, and may leverage this incen-
tive in order to obtain better terms (i.e. lower production
cost and ﬁnal sale price) in the public sector within disease-
endemic countries.14 PDPs can assist in bringing overall
costs down by leading and ﬁnancing the registration
processes, or by ﬁnding other partners for this purpose.
4.4 Governance of PDPs
PDPs maintain governance independence as self-estab-
lished entities, though they depend on external ﬁnancing.
The management of R&D projects involves partners that
are vertically disintegrated, and this internal management
structure brings ﬂexibility to PDPs in their decision-
making. There is little pressure for PDPs to expand, as is
the case with pharmaceutical ﬁrms that often face pressure
to undertake mergers and acquisitions in order to keep up
with the growth expectations of shareholders. Pressure to
contract in size is more likely, in the case of reduced funds.
In the PDP analysis, it makes sense to give attention to
the role of R&D managers and managerial processes (tech-
nical advisory body, board and managers), as the PDPs’
main job is to build and manage R&D project portfolios.
Managers play the critical role of coordinating and over-
seeing partners’ separate tasks and building synergies, as
most R&D activities undertaken by PDPs are undertaken
outside of the PDP. The leadership in terms of decision-
making remains within PDPs, while in most PDPs, the
R&D activities are outsourced to partners, which have
been described as ‘virtual’ R&D organizations (Grace
2006, 2010). PDPs build specialized capabilities in project
portfolio management by focusing on a single type of
medical product and a single disease or a core set of
diseases. Such a framework endows PDPs with disease-
type experience that biotechnology or pharmaceutical
ﬁrms rarely have.
The entrepreneurial aspect of PDPs deserves to be high-
lighted. PDPs are built by individuals or groups of indi-
viduals with an idea (their purpose is to drive R&D into
neglected diseases), who identify opportunities within the
ecosystem (new sources of philanthropic ﬁnancing and
growing openness to R&D collaboration in the pharma-
ceutical sector) and design an organizational form under
which it may be possible to assemble the resources/
capabilities needed to carry out R&D, taking into
account the speciﬁcities of the market for new products
for neglected diseases. The organizational and managerial
processes in PDPs include: selecting targets for R&D
projects and management of the project portfolio,
including the various alliances/contractors. Managers,
advised by boards and technical bodies have a central
role in making operational and strategic decisions to
identify complementarities and select and align internal
and external assets for developing target products, and
then in engaging external partners where necessary to
access the necessary assets and capabilities. This ‘asset or-
chestration’ (Teece 2012) is a core capability that PDPs
need to build and continuously strengthen.
Experienced project managers are core assets of PDPs.
Once disease and target product proﬁles are set by the PDP
(taking into account scientiﬁc, ﬁnancing and access con-
siderations), project managers source, negotiate and
manage partnerships with public and private-sector par-
ticipants. They drive discovery projects, select which
promising candidates to advance to trials or products to
advance through the pipeline or projects to terminate. In
managing risk, the considerations for PDPs are similar to
those for pharmaceutical ﬁrms. The overall measure of
success in advancing the R&D portfolio is the number of
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product approvals that meet the target product proﬁle,
with few project terminations. PDPs work on the basis
of attrition rates and pre-established milestones and time-
lines. The effectiveness of a PDP is eval;uated through
project portfolio management, based on the initial plan.
This is the same overall process as in a pharmaceutical or
biotechnology company. In general, PDPs have adopted
‘private sector’ managerial methods for their work. They
are not-for-proﬁt, but nevertheless aim to operate efﬁ-
ciently. Donors/funders also monitor PDP performance
and may require measures of cost-effectiveness and
public health impact, although donor requirements are
not harmonized, nor are the processes or measures
harmonized among PDPs.
Generally, PDPs have a small, core team of staff with
public health and industry experience, whose work is
overseen by a board. PDPs try to compensate for their
limited internal capacity in terms of their own staff
(limited experience in project management from discovery
up to development and delivery) by engaging outside ex-
pertise in an advisory manner (similar to the WHO TDR
model). External expert advisory bodies provide additional
technical and scientiﬁc expertise. Boards are inﬂuential in
the overall strategy and portfolio design of PDPs, but
project management tends to be left to the project
managers who form the core PDP staff. The technical
staff members in PDPs also receive advice from technical
advisory committees that are composed of experts in
medical product development and related areas. The mem-
bership of the board mixes skill and experience from the
public and private sectors. The incentives for members of
the board are not monetary.
4.5 PDP capabilities
We now identify several types of capabilities that PDPs in
their ‘systems integrator’ role need to build and maintain.
PDPs need strong organizational capabilities to detect and
obtain the necessary resources and capabilities, which may
reside in multiple sources. Once these resources and
capabilities have been obtained, PDPs bring them
together into a single R&D project designed to meet its
health needs, as well as to make key decisions throughout
the project lifetime, such as whether to terminate a project
and product pricing. PDPs also require strategic planning
capacity, particularly at the initial stage when building the
target product proﬁle and in making strategic decisions
thereafter, for instance, on the choice of technology and
partners. Staff and governance structure is a key source for
building the necessary organizational capabilities. The
knowledge capabilities required include: knowledge of
the diseases, context and demand, knowledge of medical
product R&D at all stages and requirements for product
approval. PDPs also require negotiation, strategy and
marketing capabilities in relation to contracting services,
building R&D collaborations, and mobilizing funding and
broader public support for their activities. The ﬁnancial
capability of PDPs is directly related to their ability to
detect and mobilize external funding sources.
Communication and relational capabilities are also
central in the PDP structure, which requires frequent inter-
action with donors, endemic-country governments and
partners, among others. Finally, PDPs require the
capacity to adapt to changes in their environment, such
as: ﬂux in the burden of diseases, ﬁnancial resources,
government priorities and the entrance or exit of other
initiatives on medical product innovation for neglected
diseases.
5. PDPs: Variety within the landscape
While PDPs share common characteristics, there are im-
portant differences among PDPs (see Table 1). PDPs vary
in their legal form, scope, internal structure and how they
make strategic choices.
Table 1. Common characteristics and differences of PDPs
PDP Common Characteristics PDP Differences
Non-proﬁt institutions Legal form: stand-alone
versus part of another
organization, permanent
versus temporary
The objective is product development of
medicines, diagnostics, vaccines and
biologicals for neglected diseases
Scope: disease and geo-
graphical coverage, type
of medical products de-
veloped, involvement in
implementation phase
Priority-setting is driven by medical
needs: products developed need to be
affordable and adequate to the local
context to facilitate uptake. Deﬁne
the target product proﬁle. Requires
low cost of product manufacturing
and selling price
Internal structure: size of
staff and roles,
outsourced versus in-
house R&D capacity,
governance model,
external advisory
support
The public health goal and R&D object-
ive of PDPs drive their strategic
choices (i.e. priority setting, govern-
ance and sources of ﬁnancing)
Strategic choices: IP
policy, partner selection
and type of relationship,
transfer of technology to
developing countries,
capacity building for de-
veloping countries
Collaborative R&D model: most PDPs
have little or no in-house R&D
activities, work with a diversity of
partners from the public and private
sectors. Managing the collaborations
is the key task of a small core
number of in-house staff in PDPs
Internal structure: core staff, board,
advisory committee
Funding from philanthropic and public
sources
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5.1 Legal form
While PDPs are all non-proﬁt institutions, they vary in
their speciﬁc legal form. Most PDPs are stand-alone
entities, yet a few are part of a larger organization (i.e.
MVP and MVI are part of PATH, the Sabin PDP is
part of the Sabin Vaccine Institute). Likewise, most
PDPs are registered as non-governmental organizations
(i.e. IAVI and TB Alliance), while some are recognized
as international organizations (i.e. DNDi, FIND and
MMV in Switzerland). PDPs are generally created as a
permanent institution, but some PDPs, particularly those
that are a project of a larger institution, can be of a tem-
porary nature, to complete a particular goal (i.e. develop a
medical product for a speciﬁc disease target) and are
discontinued thereafter (i.e. MDP ceased activity in 2009,
although the founding organizations continue to carry out
similar work).
5.2 Scope
PDPs vary in scope, including: the terms of their disease
coverage, geographical area for which they target their
medical products, the type of medical product they
develop (medicine, microbiocide, vaccine or diagnostic),
and the level of involvement of the PDP in activities
during the implementation phase.
Table 2 classiﬁes the PDPs in accordance with the type
of medical product they aim to develop. We identiﬁed 15
PDPs for vaccines, four PDPs for new medicines, four
PDPs for microbiocides, and two PDPs for diagnostics.
The variance in the disease coverage of PDPs is pre-
sented in Appendix 1. Most PDPs focus on a single
disease, although some PDPs cover up to six diseases.
Malaria is the disease most covered. The proﬁle of each
disease presents speciﬁc challenges for medical product de-
velopment through the PDP model. For example, while
most neglected diseases affect particular geographical
regions or countries, some diseases such as HIV/AIDS,
malaria and TB have a broader geographical reach in
terms of disease burden. In turn, this creates some level
of market incentives for private partners (i.e. populations
in developed countries travelling to endemic-ridden areas
in developing countries for tourism or military missions).
Disease proﬁles also vary in their mortality rates and
incidence. Moreover, the scientiﬁc and knowledge chal-
lenges vary among diseases (i.e. whether or not any
products are currently available for prevention/treatment
or cure).
PDPs also vary in their level of involvement in the late-
stage development process. While all PDPs work from the
point of discovery to product development, some PDPs
stop at the point where the product is developed, while
others continue to follow up implementation activities,
including assisting in product pre-qualiﬁcation by WHO,
national registration and uptake and delivery in endemic
countries.
5.3 Internal structure
The size of core staff of PDPs varies largely in respect to
the size of the PDPs’ R&D portfolio and disease coverage.
Some PDPs that have a large portfolio have operations in
more than one country or location. We also ﬁnd some
variance in the speciﬁc roles of the staff, board and
advisory committees and their relationships with each
other and partners involved in R&D projects.
5.4 Strategic choices
There is a signiﬁcant variance in the strategic choices of
PDPs in terms of the way R&D is undertaken, how the
portfolio is managed, and in particular, the selection of
and agreements with partners. While most PDPs do not
carry out R&D activities in-house, some PDPs do under-
take their own research, as in the case of IDRI and
AERAS. PDPs also vary signiﬁcantly in the way they
manage their R&D project portfolios.
As noted in Section 4.3, some PDPs deﬁne upfront target
product proﬁles for the R&D project. However, some PDPs
adopt a more ﬂexible approach to determine product
proﬁles, for example, opting to deﬁne a pricing strategy
for the new medical product at a later stage. PDPs may
also vary as to whether they have a deﬁned ‘access’ policy
(guidelines as to how to ensure that the new medical
product will be available to those in need). Most PDPs
have some basic principles for ensuring access that guide
Table 2. Type of medical product by PDP
Drug Vaccine Vector
control
products
Microbicide Diagnostic
AERAS X
MMV X
DVI X
EVI X
IVCC X
IAVI X
OWH X X X
IVI X
MVI X
MVP X
PDVI X
Sabin PDP X
SAAVI X
TBVI X
DNDi X
CPDD X
TB Alliance X
IDRI X X X
CONRAD X
HVTN X
IPM X
MDP X
FIND X
Total 6 14 1 3 3
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negotiations for access to knowledge (compounds for
screening), low cost of production from industry partners
and royalty-free licenses, at least for endemic countries.
In some PDPs, negotiations and relationships with
partners are guided by broader policies, in areas such as
intellectual property (IP). An IP policy serves in some
PDPs to inform their strategy for the management of in-
tellectual property rights (IPRs), in particular to ensure
that IPRs do not create obstacles for the PDP to access
know-how and assets, affordability of new products, and
follow-on R&D. However, in some PDPs, decisions on IP
management are taken on a case-by-case basis, which is
considered to provide the PDP with greater ﬂexibility.
Overall, there is signiﬁcant variance in PDP practices on
IP (Mun˜oz 2014). Some PDPs deﬁne at the outset that IP
should generally not be sought for any product developed,
while others deﬁne that the partner can claim or share with
the PDP the IP from a potential product along with
licensing terms (i.e. non-exclusive or exclusive terms of
licenses for pre-existing IP or new products developed).
PDPs may also have particular policies concerning the
level of control that the PDP, partner or funder may
have over the R&D project (decision-making). PDPs gen-
erally face greater pressure from partners to have a stake in
decision-making when the ﬁnancial input of the partner is
substantial. PDPs may also have particular policies con-
cerning funding sources (such as specifying a minimum
percentage of the PDP budget that should be covered by
public as opposed to private funding). PDPs also vary in
the extent to which they consider capacity building and the
transfer of technology to developing countries to be a part
of their mission. For example, DNDi includes these
activities as a part of its mandate. In South Africa,
SAAVI is linked to the national Medical Research
Council, and its work includes programmes to support
community involvement and education interventions in
relation to HIV issues.
There are numerous projects that include the transfer of
technology to developing countries, such as the involve-
ment of the ﬁrm Zenufa, based in Tanzania, as a second
manufacturer of ASAQ (a DNDi product). Another
example is the meningitis vaccine MenAfriVac,
manufactured by the Serum Institute of India Ltd, Pune,
India (a product from MVP). The decision on whether to
go with a manufacturer in a developed country, or with
clinical research organization from a developing country is
also a strategic one. Considerations include: the cost of
production and knowledge of the disease and local
context to promote affordability and uptake of the
medical product in endemic countries.
6. Discussion
So far, we have shown that PDPs contribute to increasing
R&D in order to address the lack of new medical products
for neglected diseases. We have also explained how PDPs
function within the broader context of medical product
innovation ecosystems, and how PDPs are able to bring
about R&D collaboration. We have also identiﬁed the core
capabilities that PDPs need to build and strengthen in
playing the role of ‘system integrator’ to stimulate R&D
in neglected diseases. Furthermore, we have analysed the
variety among the PDP landscape. We now discuss the
potential shortcomings of the organizational form and
current operation of PDPs.
6.1 Constraints on the determinants of
R&D productivity
PDPs still appear to have limited R&D capabilities. In the
case of pharmaceuticals, to date PDPs have focused to a
substantial extent on ‘low-hanging fruit’: existing drugs
being evaluated for new indications, new formulations of
existing drugs, novel ﬁxed-dose combinations, but not
NCE. PDPs have yet to prove whether they can develop
NCE, though there are a number of NCE projects in late-
stage clinical trials. NCE are riskier to invent than ﬁnding
new uses for existing drugs or new formulations. The latter
can be developed in a shorter time frame, and thus can be
delivered to those in need of a shorter time frame.
Nevertheless, the discovery of new NCE will be needed
to achieve substantial improvements in terms of thera-
peutic beneﬁts over existing drugs. Transaction costs and
coordination costs are higher and more complex.
Mobilizing sufﬁcient ﬁnancing for projects on NCE is a
major challenge.
Project managers in PDPs need to be highly skilled in
order to accomplish the range of activities they may be
entrusted with, or if these activities are separated among
project managers (by R&D phase or activity), they will
need to be highly coordinated among them (i.e. scientiﬁc
expertise, evaluating licensing opportunities and designing
appropriate clinical trials).
The size of PDPs may vary, though generally they are
small organizations. The empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between ﬁrm size and innovation is inconsistent
(Cohen 2010). Some empirical literature ﬁnds that in the
pharmaceutical industry, size confers an advantage.
Henderson and Cockburn (1996) found that discoveries
in larger pharmaceutical ﬁrms are more productive,
deriving from economies of scope and scale. Yet in drug
development, large ﬁrms have the advantage of scope,
rather than returns to scale (Cockburn and Henderson
2001). However, small ﬁrms (such as biotechnology
ﬁrms) can be highly innovative. The share of NCE attrib-
utable to small biotechnology and pharmaceutical ﬁrms
has increased to nearly 70% since 1980 (Munos 2009).
Moreover, the large scale of R&D portfolios in large
pharmaceutical ﬁrms and trends in growth via mergers
and acquisitions have not led to their increased
innovativeness in terms of newly approved NCE.
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PDPs with small project portfolios may have a perverse
incentive to cling onto projects that should otherwise be
terminated. There is evidence that single-product
early-stage ﬁrms are more reluctant to abandon the devel-
opment of their only viable drug candidates, in contrast to
ﬁrms with multiple products in development (Guedj and
Scharfstein 2004).
6.2 Constraints on financing and priority setting
Governments of disease-endemic countries, global health
organizations (particularly WHO) and, public and philan-
thropic donors lack coordinated R&D priority agendas
and funding efforts, based on the global burden of
diseases. Currently activities are highly disjoined.15 This
lack of coordination is also reﬂected among PDPs.
PDPs, as has been pointed out with respect to other
multi-stakeholder institutions in global health, derive
their legitimacy from their effectiveness in improving spe-
ciﬁcally deﬁned health outputs and outcomes, in contrast
to traditional multilateral agencies, which derive legitim-
acy from multi-government representation and deliber-
ation (Sridhar 2012). In PDPs, donors decide on the
priority areas for funding, the conditions attached to
fund disbursements, instruments for control, transparency
requirements etc. These requirements are not harmonized
among PDPs, nor are they made public. The risk is that the
priorities of governments, particularly from endemic-
disease countries, do not match those of the donor. Thus
the R&D efforts made by PDPs may deliver products that
will not ﬁnd entry in disease-endemic countries. Currently
there is no assurance that the current portfolio of PDPs’
R&D projects will match the expectations of disease-
endemic countries.
PDPs maintain close relationships with partners in col-
laborative R&D schemes. The interests and priorities of
various partners, public and private, can be at odds. The
PDP has the role of neutrally managing these tensions, but
it is not exempt from inﬂuence. Hence, PDP access and
other related policies are critically important. Not all PDPs
openly disclose their policies for the establishment of part-
nerships. None disclose the details of the deals made.
While this is standard practice in the pharmaceutical
industry, in pursuing the public health objectives of
PDPs in the non-proﬁt framework, greater transparency
should be expected.
PDPs, as independent entities, could use added oversight
from the global public health community. Currently some
level of oversight is exerted only privately by funders.
WHO could provide additional leadership in establishing
priority areas for R&D in neglected diseases and could
coordinate with other new multi-stakeholder institutions
that assist in the purchasing and disbursement of new
medical products such as the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the GAVI
Alliance. However, the ability of countries to align their
priorities for programmes with the budget at WHO is cur-
rently restricted. Member States approve and decide on the
use of only the portion of the budget that is ﬁnanced by
Member State contributions (about 25% of total funding),
while donors decide on the use of extra-budgetary (volun-
tary) funding (over 80% of total funding) from State and
non-State actors.16
In addition, donors, especially philanthropic founda-
tions, are not responsive to any broader global health com-
munity. Their legitimacy, as in the case of PDPs, rests in
the effectiveness of their interventions, but is not linked to
any accountability to governments. With the extent of
their resources, they are able to exert enormous inﬂuence
on global health policies. The interviews we conducted
point out that PDPs are not always clear in terms of
who is setting the priorities for the PDP. Moreover,
various interests are aligned, whether it is the funder,
(i.e. with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation being
the largest philanthropic donor), the board, the pharma-
ceutical industry partner, or the government of endemic-
disease countries. When a representative of a PDP was
interviewed, we were told:
When Gates says that we should increase efforts for vaccines,
we know that the risk for PDPs not in the vaccine ﬁeld is real.
There could be potential conﬂicts of interests in the board,
for example, when an active pharmaceutical company rep-
resentative or funder (i.e. Gates Foundation or Me´decins
Sans Frontiers) is on the board. PDPs do not seem to have
a clear strategy on how to tackle the issues. Some PDPs
want to maintain independence and give assurance of
being a neutral catalyst for R&D, while others consider
it to be of great importance to have key partners repre-
sented on the board.
PDP ﬁnancing is not assured on a long time horizon.
PDPs are highly vulnerable to ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancing,
especially at times of ﬁnancial downturns which affect gov-
ernments and donors. Public and donor ﬁnancing to PDPs
are reported to have decreased in the light of the economic
downturn since 2008, and are down by US$128.7 million
(Policy Cures 2012). Furthermore, PDPs must invest con-
siderable resources to be used in fundraising and public
relations. They have to undertake marketing and
advocacy activities to attract new funding. PDPs’ R&D
portfolios are mostly in the early stages (development
and early clinical stages), with important exceptions. As
projects progress to larger clinical trials, the costs will
likely increase signiﬁcantly, together with total funding
needs. There may not be adequate cost estimations of the
total funds needed for completion. Some PDPs are already
struggling to ensure the estimated funding required for
their phase III projects (as is the case with DNDi
projections).
Some PDPs have been experimenting with alternative
means to raise ﬁnancing, in addition to advocating for
increased resource allocations from the global health
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community. For example, IDRI created three for-proﬁt
start-ups (biotechnology companies) as a means to
continue ﬁnancing for its non-proﬁt arm, including
licensing vaccine adjuvants to pharmaceutical ﬁrms for de-
veloped country markets that were originally developed
for neglected diseases (Schubert 2009). One problem
identiﬁed is that PDPs cannot attract venture capital or
some types of grants (i.e. small business grants in the
USA) that are available to small innovative ﬁrms, but
not to non-proﬁts. However, the relationship between the
non-proﬁt and for-proﬁt arms of PDPs is likely to increase
tensions with respect to the public interest mission of
PDPs.
6.3 Constraints of access and delivery
The PDP setup creates tensions between incentives for
R&D and access goals. In practice, managing an agenda
of R&D plus access is complex. A case example is deﬁning
the product price and IPR policy. In cases where the
market is too small to stimulate competition, products
will need to be supplied at cost, or at a price corresponding
to a small margin above the lowest manufacturing costs to
ensure sustainability of production. Yet, due to asymmet-
ric information, PDPs can be paying higher than ‘at cost’
to partners, who may also seek IPR protection for the new
medical products, in particular, for diseases that have some
commercial market (i.e. HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and
meningitis).
PDPs also face the challenges of ensuring that the end
users can access products once they are developed.
Introducing new tools for various indications has often
been associated with a signiﬁcant delay between global
availability and local adoption. Donors are funding
product development, but not product delivery. The
capacity to conduct research to support and sustain
public health initiatives in developing countries remains
weak, which is a barrier to the long-term availability of
existing products.
6.4 Constraints of contracting and
coordination problems
The disintegrated R&D structure of the majority of PDPs
raises contracting problems and transaction costs, as
compared to centralized, vertically integrated R&D
within a single organization (Cockburn 2005).
Problems of asymmetric information exist in contracting
with partners. Academic researchers may be better aware
of the true value of their research, and may consult
contract research organizations about the costs of clinical
trials, and pharmaceutical ﬁrms about the cost of
manufacturing and distribution. Moral hazard may
occur, in particular in manufacturing. Given that the
PDPs cover most of the costs, the ﬁrm involved is therefore
more likely to take risks. The contractual terms of PDP
collaborations are not disclosed. Non-disclosure of con-
tractual terms makes it more difﬁcult for PDPs to share
information, learn from each other’s experience and share
it with outside R&D projects. In particular, IPR terms can
limit the freedom of PDPs to coordinate R&D, grant
sublicenses for manufacturing and other activities with
third parties.
We observe that PDPs tend to select those with whom
they have previously worked. A possible explanation is
incomplete information on potential partners. In doing
so, opportunities for collaboration may be missed, for
example, with partners from disease-endemic countries.
PDPs operate independently, with no overall
coordinating entity or public policy guidance on priority
setting, other than their own PDP governance structure
and the pursuit of their mission. The only coordinating
entity, to some extent, is the Gates Foundation. As a
funder of several PDPs, the Foundation sees the broader
picture of PDPs’ R&D projects: yet, an analysis of PDP
portfolios or other initiatives to coordinate at a broader
level are not disclosed to the public. PDPs may be subject
to the problems that pharmaceutical ﬁrms face in pursuing
the same leads to dead ends, making unnecessary efforts to
replicate screening, and studies that others have already
undertaken.
There can also be a lack of coordination and collabor-
ation among PDPs, leading to unnecessary duplication of
efforts, though we do not have sufﬁcient evidence to
explore the extent to which this may be affecting R&D
outcomes. The topic of competition in a non-proﬁt
economy is not often explored. In the case of PDPs, it is
evident that PDPs may be competing with one another for
the same select sources of funding to capture resources.
The overlapping of R&D portfolios in terms of diseases
or leads may not constitute a problem in itself, given the
high levels of failure that can be expected in medical
product development, particularly vaccines and new
drugs. However, resources may be wasted, and spill-
overs may be foregone by a potential lack of cooperation
and sharing of information and resources among PDPs. If
the sources of ﬁnancing for PDPs are not assured, or if
policies are not implemented by governments and funders
to regulate PDP behaviour in another direction, this com-
petitive environment can be expected to continue.
However, there are indications that PDPs are working to
increase coordination and collaboration among them-
selves. For example, the TB Alliance granted DNDi a
royalty-free license to develop anti-TB compounds for
use against other neglected diseases in the R&D portfolio
of DNDi.
Sharing information among PDPs can also serve to
build collective bargaining power to achieve better deals
and to strengthen their future negotiating positions with
partners, particularly with pharmaceutical ﬁrms. PDPs
could share with one another their experiences in
negotiating with partners, the terms of deals, including a
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better understanding of how ﬁrms deﬁne terms such as: ‘at
cost’, ‘no loss’, ‘fully burdened manufacturing cost’ and
‘cost plus’, which may signiﬁcantly vary the cost of a
PDP R&D project, and strategies for IPR management.
PDPs could also work more closely in their common op-
erations, in areas such as advocacy to donors and technol-
ogy platforms to bring down costs and increase
effectiveness.
6.5 Constraints of insufficient transparency
As independent non-proﬁt organizations, PDPs face
demands for accountability from various sources,
including: donors, endemic-country governments,
partners and end users of the medical products that
they aim to treat. They are legally accountable in terms
of compliance with the health regulatory standards for
new medical products in general. However, PDPs could
improve their transparency and disclosure, as well as per-
formance assessment mechanisms. PDPs and their
partners neither systemically nor publicly disclose all
relevant scientiﬁc and clinical data that could be useful,
for example, in cases when clinical trials fail to avoid
making the same mistakes or following the same leads.
PDPs need to make the terms of their deals with partners,
ﬁnancial allocations and costs of their R&D projects
more transparent in order to allow proper evaluation.
PDPs could increase their credibility and legitimacy by
establishing governance instruments and institutional
policies to reduce the risk of capture or undue inﬂuence
by donors and other actors and could avoid conﬂicts of
interests in managing their R&D portfolios. Some PDPs
have established policies, for example, with respect to
ensuring multiple sources of ﬁnancing to avoid donor
capture, and policies on access and management of
IPR, but these are isolated initiatives. There is also a
lack of systemic assessment of PDPs, based on a
commonly agreed upon methodology or metrics.
Despite the growing amount of resources being
challenged for neglected disease R&D to PDPs, there
are no reliable methods or regular assessment reviews of
PDP performance, as compared to other alternatives
(Ridley 2004).
6.6 Constraints of insufficient use of capabilities in
disease-endemic countries
Not all PDPs see their mission as seeking to build up the
capacity of developing countries themselves and technol-
ogy transfer to undertake R&D on treatments for those
diseases that particularly affect disease-endemic countries.
Greater R&D capacity in developing countries has many
beneﬁts, such as lower R&D costs, price of manufacturing
and distribution, and increasing market competition to
drive down long-term prices for medical products. In the
case of the meningitis vaccine developed by the PATH
MVP, the India Serum Vaccine Institute was able to
offer to manufacture the vaccine at the target price set
by MVI, which would allow endemic-country governments
to procure the vaccine at US$0.50 a dose. No other large
vaccine manufacturer was willing to produce at this price.
PDPs should seek greater collaboration with emerging
economies that are increasing their role in the neglected
disease landscape.17
7. Conclusions
We have described an interesting phenomenon under the
lens of the economics of innovation. PDPs are a new form
of pharmaceutical R&D in the area of neglected diseases.
We have found evidence that PDPs are able to bring about
new medical products. We did not consider the efﬁciency
of the PDP organizational form, as compared to others.
Reasons for having not carried out any efﬁciency analysis
are various. In particular, the data needed to undertake
such an analysis were not available, and even if the data
had been obtained, the absence of counterfactual cases
would have strongly limited the scope of the analysis.
Moreover, the various PDPs investigated in this paper
are not readily comparable because they deal with different
diseases and medical products. Thus, the scientiﬁc and
technological problems they try to solve are of different
levels of complexity.
In this study, we exclusively analysed the experience of
PDPs in the area of neglected diseases. Nonetheless, there
is increasing academic and policy interest in exploring the
potential of PDPs in other areas, such as antibiotics.18
There is also growing interest in promoting greater collab-
oration and information sharing to advance drug develop-
ment, particularly in the pre-competitive stage of
discovery.19
We ﬁnd that PDPs act as ‘system integrators’ that
leverage the resources and capabilities of a diverse
network of public, philanthropic and private-sector part-
nerships. PDPs are able to mobilize private ﬁrms to join
R&D projects and provide in-kind contributions. By
binding together and coordinating the activities of
various ﬁrms and other organizations, the PDP integrator
role is beneﬁcial to all involved. PDPs facilitate access to
the ﬁnancing and exchange of knowledge. Additionally,
they diffuse knowledge among the groups that in turn,
may also be internalized by individual participants.
Public policy should encourage PDP types of activities
and R&D collaborations.
Some of the constraints we found associated with PDPs
are: coordination problems, insufﬁcient transparency in
contractual terms with partners and the mismatch
between the ﬁnancing horizons of donors and the time
frame of medical product development.
The future of the PDP landscape remains uncertain.
Some PDPs that have completed their activities (or
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whose funding has ceased) have disappeared, while others
have merged into larger PDP organizations. This may be
an indication that there is a need for scale and scope in
PDP operations, in the context of uncertain ﬁnancing. It
would be useful for PDPs to increase their transparency in
their internal operations, their policies on critical issues
such as access and IPRs, as well as in their dealings with
funders and partners. Such transparency may be forthcom-
ing if greater oversight is undertaken by international
health organizations, for instance, the WHO, neglected
disease-endemic countries and public funders. An agree-
ment for increased global coordination of priority setting
for R&D and resource allocation directed at neglected
diseases, for instance, through the WHO, would serve to
direct the work of PDPs in a more coherent and transpar-
ent manner. According to Weder and Grubel (1993),
private agents have found many ways to internalize
R&D externalities and solve coordination problems that
arise from the public good nature of knowledge and
research. They call these solutions ‘Coasean institutions’,
according to the principle developed by Ronald Coase
(1960), and advance that knowledge externalities induce
the creation of private institutions capable of internalizing
them. The institution analysed and documented in this
paper (the PDPs) clearly represent a new Coasean
solution to this broad class of problems, including R&D
and knowledge externalities, as well as coordination
failures in decentralized markets for knowledge and new
products.20
A limitation of this paper is the lack of infor-
mation available concerning the contractual terms of
PDP collaborations with partners and processes for
determining how funds are allocated to partners. This
information is not publicly available, and it was not
possible to collect comparable data. If such information
were available, future research could evaluate the
performance of PDPs, including resource allocation, selec-
tion and termination of R&D projects and the appropri-
ateness, affordability and health impact of new medical
products produced by PDPs, as compared to other
sources, or alternatives to promote R&D in neglected
diseases.
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Notes
1. The diseases concerned are: Buruli ulcer; Chagas
disease; cysticercosis; dengue; dracunculiasis;
echinococcosis; endemic treponematoses; foodborne
trematode infections; human African trypanosomiasis;
leishmaniasis; leprosy; lymphatic ﬁlariasis;, onchocer-
ciasis; rabies; schistosomiasis; soil-transmitted
helminthiases; and trachoma.
2. The inclusion of these diseases is consistent with other
studies (Trouiller et al. 2002; Policy Cures 2012).
3. There can be ample variance, depending on the disease
(the extent of R&D gaps, market attractiveness) and
the type of product and means of undertaking clinical
trials.
4. An AMC programme has yet to be tried for
incentivizing new medical products. The ﬁrst experi-
ence in the design of a large-scale pull instrument was
the AMC GAVI Alliance initiative, which has been in
place since 2009 to make available existing pneumo-
coccal vaccines. It was designed by a group of econo-
mists (Levine et al. 2005). Governments and the Gates
Foundation made a binding commitment of US$1.5
billion to fund the pilot AMC for which vaccine manu-
facturers could bid. In 2010, GSK and Pﬁzer
committed to supply 30 million doses of their pneumo-
coccal vaccines for ten years. These vaccines had
recently been approved in Europe and the USA
(Synﬂorix and Prevenar-13) at a maximum price of
US$3.50 a dose. The two vaccines were selling for an
average of E40 in Europe and US$90 per injection in
the USA. Each manufacturer’s share of the AMC
funds is disbursed as a subsidy per dose, in addition
to the tail price of US$3.50 thus, the total price goes
up to US$7 for approximately the ﬁrst 20% of vaccine
doses procured from each manufacturer (Cernuschi
et al. 2011). The aim is to enable ﬁrms to quickly
recover incremental investment costs incurred to
allow the scaling up of supply capacity to serve
GAVI-eligible countries faster through the WHO
and UNICEF as procurement agents. The expectation
is that the vaccines will be distributed to 40 developing
countries that will pay 15 cents of the US$3.50, with
the remaining cost covered by the AMC. The estimate
cost per child receiving the vaccine is US$4.722
(Scudellari 2011). Some concerns that have been
raised include: the costs of the system, transparency
by ﬁrms on vaccine manufacturing costs and proﬁt
margins, geographical scope, eligible purchasing
agents, and entry of developing country producers
that can lower the vaccine costs (Me´decins Sans
Frontie`res 2013).
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5. Some of these proposals include: the Product
Development Partnership Financing Facility, the
industry R&D Facilitation Fund the Fund for
Research in Neglected Diseases, and a fund within a
global framework on health R&D. These proposals
are reviewed in the WHO report (World Health
Organization 2012b: 176–9).
6. Our complete list of PDPs includes (in alphabetical
order): AERAS; Contraceptive Research and
Development (CONRAD); Consortium for Parasitic
Drug Development (CPDD); Dengue Vaccine
Initiative (DVI); Drugs for Neglected Diseases
(DNDi); the European Vaccine Initiative (EVI);
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics
(FIND); Global Alliance for TB Drug
Development (TB Alliance); HIV Vaccines Trials
Network (HVTN); Infectious Disease Research
Institute (IDRI); Innovative Vector Control
Consortium (IVCC); International AIDS Vaccine
Initiative (IAVI); International Partnership for
Microbiocides (IPM); International Vaccine Institute
(IVI); Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI); Medicine for
Malaria Venture (MMV); Meningitis Vaccine Project
(MVP); Microbiocides Development Programme
(MDP); One World Health (OWH); Paediatric
Dengue Vaccines Initiative (PDVI); Sabin PDP;
South African AIDS Vaccine Initiative (SAAVI);
and the Turberculosis Vaccine Initiative (TVI). To
date, we have interviewed several representatives
from four PDPs, two of which produce drugs
(DNDi and MMV), one of which produces vaccines
(MVP) and one of which produces diagnostics
(FIND).
7. We include PDPs that are part of a larger PDP organ-
ization, (i.e. MVP and MVI are part of PATH; the,
Sabin PDP is part of the Sabin Vaccine Institute).
8. Instruments such as direct grants to small and medium
ﬁrms and for clinical trials in developing countries,
milestone or end prizes, purchase or procurement
agreements, among others, can be complementary to
the role of PDPs, and PDPs themselves can use them.
9. The WHO is the leading directing and coordinating
authority for health within the United Nations
system. The WHO TDR programme, in existence
since 1975, is cosponsored by UNICEF, UNDP and
the World Bank. The aim of the programme was to
intensify research on major tropical parasitic diseases
(taking into consideration that such activities should
be carried out mainly in endemic countries),, deﬁne the
research priorities, extend cooperation with national
institutions and other governmental and non-govern-
mental organizations in regard to the coordination of
research in this ﬁeld, and mobilize extra-budgetary re-
sources for scaling up these objectives (World Health
Assembly 27.52). The TDR was set up mainly as a
partnership between public donors, co-sponsors and
endemic-country governments represented in an inde-
pendent board-type structure (UNICEF et al. 2007).
10. MMV was created in 1999. The TB Alliance was es-
tablished in 2000. In 2003, the DNDi was created as a
joint initiative of MSF, TDR and representatives of
disease-endemic countries. FIND was also established
in 2003.
11. The IDRI was created as a non-proﬁt research insti-
tute in 1993.
12. Access to the chemical compound collections of
pharmaceutical ﬁrms is very important. However,
the ﬁrms themselves caution that the existing
chemical diversity in pharmaceutical ﬁrms in search
of new drugs is limited (Payne et al. 2007). The port-
folio of several PDPs includes projects for radical in-
novations (i.e. the discovery of NCE).
13. The results of phase III trials of the vaccine’s capacity
have shown approximately a 50% success rate.
14. A case example is the combination drug ASAQ de-
veloped by DNDi in partnership with Sanoﬁ. It is
now registered in over 30 sub-Saharan countries and
India, and is prequaliﬁed by WHO. DNDi developed
ASAQ in collaboration with Sanoﬁ and other
partners. It claimed a patent and then licensed it out
to Sanoﬁ for African and other developing countries.
Under the DNDi/Sanoﬁ agreement, Sanoﬁ has
committed to supply the public sector in endemic
countries at a no-proﬁt-no-loss maximum price of
US$1. In the private sector, Sanoﬁ is free to sell at
market price and pays a royalty back to DNDi,
which is reinvested in additional studies. DNDi and
Sanoﬁ agreed not to ﬁle any new patents: as a result,
the drug can be freely produced and distributed by any
other pharmaceutical company in the world. DNDi is
currently facilitating technology transfer to ensure the
production of ASAQ by an African manufacturer.
15. A WHO expert working group (CEWG) proposed a
binding R&D treaty to improve priority setting based
on public health needs, and to promote increased gov-
ernment ﬁnancing for R&D and coordination among
public and private R&D (World Health Organization
2012b). There are proposals by governments, civil
societies, and PDPs for the establishment of a global
R&D framework that monitors, coordinates, and
ﬁnances medical innovations for neglected popula-
tions, in the form of a new R&D treaty (Drugs for
Neglected Diseases Initiative and Me´decins Sans
Frontie`res 2012) to establish a Global Health R&D
Observatory within WHO.
16. See the WHO document A66/48, WHO Reform,
Financing of WHO, 66th World Health Assembly,
Provisional Agenda Item 11, 13 May 2013.
17. See So and Ruiz-Esparza (2012).
18. See World Health Organization (2012a).
19. See Ekins et al. (2013). In the case of neglected
diseases, openness is facilitated by the particularity
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that funding comes from public sources, and potential
proﬁts are nil or low. For other diseases, IP and proﬁt
margins are central components of the business
strategy of ﬁrms, and may be the case for academia,
as well. In this context, the incentive for openness and
knowledge sharing in product development is weaker,
although on the whole, it would be beneﬁcial to speed
up medical product development.
20. However, as Weder and Grubel (1993) cautioned,
policy has to limit the natural rent-seeking activities
of private agents by establishing constraints on the
cooperative agreements that take place with ﬁrms
within the collaborative R&D structure. In the case
where public moneys are being channelled to PDPs,
policy can play a role in deﬁning the conditions for
disbursement, such that all partners work to fulﬁl the
PDP mission and avoid potential rent-seeking, and
promote greater transparency.
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